How to put your money where your strategy is PART I
Most
companies allocate the same resources to the same business units year after
year. That makes it difficult to realize strategic goals and undermines
performance. Here's how to overcome resource-allocation inertia.
Picture two global companies, each operating a range of different businesses. Company
A allocates capital, talent, and research dollars consistently every year,
making small changes but always following the same broad investment pattern.
Company B continually evaluates the performance of business units, acquires and
divests assets, and adjusts resource allocations based on each division’s
relative market opportunities. Over time, which company will be worth more?
If you guessed company
B, you’re right. In fact, our research suggests that after 15 years, it will be
worth an average of 40 percent more than company A. We also found, though, that
the vast majority of companies resemble company A. Therein lies a major disconnect
between the aspirations of many corporate strategists to boldly jettison
unattractive businesses or double down on exciting new opportunities, and the
reality of how they invest capital, talent, and other scarce resources.
For the past two years,
we’ve been systematically looking at corporate resource allocation patterns, their relationship to performance, and the
implications for strategy. We found that while inertia reigns at most
companies, in those where capital and other resources flow more readily from
one business opportunity to another, returns to shareholders are higher and the
risk of falling into bankruptcy or the hands of an acquirer lower.
We’ve also reviewed the
causes of inertia (such as cognitive biases and politics) and identified a
number of steps companies can take to overcome them. These include introducing
new decision rules and processes to ensure that the allocation of resources is
a top-of-mind issue for executives, and remaking the corporate center so it can
provide more independent counsel to the CEO and other key decision makers.
We’re not suggesting
that executives act as investment portfolio managers. That implies a search for
stand-alone returns at any cost rather than purposeful decisions that enhance a
corporation’s long-term value and strategic coherence. But given the prevalence
of stasis today, most organizations are a long way from the head-long pursuit
of disconnected opportunities. Rather, many leaders face a stark choice: shift
resources among their businesses to realize strategic goals or run the risk
that the market will do it for them. Which would you prefer?
Weighing the evidence
Every year for the past
quarter century, US capital markets have issued about $85 billion of equity and
$536 billion in associated corporate debt. During the same period, the amount
of capital allocated or reallocated within multibusiness companies was
approximately $640 billion annually—more than equity and corporate debt
combined. While most perceive markets as the primary means of directing
capital and recycling assets across industries, companies with multiple
businesses actually play a bigger role in allocating capital and other
resources across a spectrum of economic opportunities.
Capital allocations were essentially fixed
for roughly one-third of the business units in our sample.
To understand how
effectively corporations are moving their resources, we reviewed the
performance of more than 1,600 US companies between 1990 and 2005.2 The
results were striking. For one-third of the businesses in our sample, the
amount of capital received in a given year was almost exactly that received the
year before—the mean correlation was 0.99. For the economy as a whole, the mean
correlation across all industries was 0.92.
In other words, the
enormous amount of strategic planning in corporations seems to result, on the
whole, in only modest resource shifts. Whether the relevant resource is capital
expenditures, operating expenditures, or human capital, this finding is consistent
across industries as diverse as mining and consumer packaged goods. Given the
performance edge associated with higher levels of reallocation, such static
behavior is almost certainly not sensible. Our research showed the following:
·
Companies that reallocated
more resources—the top third of our sample, shifting an average of 56 percent
of capital across business units over the entire 15-year period—earned, on
average, 30 percent higher total returns to shareholders (TRS) annually than
companies in the bottom third of the sample. This result was surprisingly
consistent across all sectors of the economy. It seems that when companies
disproportionately invest in value-creating businesses, they generate a
mutually reinforcing cycle of growth and further investment options.
·
Consistent and
incremental reallocation levels diminished the variance of returns over the
long term.
·
A company in the top
third of reallocators was, on average, 13 percent more likely to avoid
acquisition or bankruptcy than low reallocators.
·
Over an average
six-year tenure, chief executives who reallocated less than their peers did in
the first three years on the job were significantly more likely than their more
active peers to be removed in years four through six. To paraphrase the philosopher
Thomas Hobbes, tenure for static CEOs is likely to be nasty, brutish, and,
above all, short.
Companies with higher levels of capital
reallocation experienced higher average shareholder returns.
We should note the
importance of a long-term view: over time spans of less than three years,
companies that reallocated higher levels of resources delivered lower
shareholder returns than their more stable peers did. One explanation for this
pattern could be risk aversion on the part of investors, who are initially
cautious about major corporate capital shifts and then recognize value only
once the results become visible. Another factor could be the deep
interconnection of resource allocation choices with corporate strategy. The
goal isn’t to make dramatic changes every year but to reallocate resources
consistently over the medium to long term in service of a clear corporate
strategy. That provides the time necessary for new investments to flourish, for
established businesses to maximize their potential, and for capital from
declining investments to be redeployed effectively. Given the richness and
complexity of the issues at play here, differences in the relationship between
short- and long-term resource shifts and financial performance is likely to be
a fruitful area for further research.
Why companies get stuck
Why do so many
companies undermine their strategic direction by allocating the same levels of
resources to business units year after year? The reasons vary widely, from the
very bad—companies operating on autopilot—to the more sensible. After all,
sometimes it’s wise to persist with previously chosen resource allocations,
especially if there are no viable reallocation opportunities or if switching
costs are too high. And companies in capital-intensive sectors, for example,
often have to commit resources more than five years ahead of time to long-term
programs, leaving less discretionary capital to play with.
For the most part,
however, the failure to pursue a more active allocation agenda is a result of organizational
inertia that has multiple causes. We’ll focus here on cognitive biases and
corporate politics, but regardless of source, inertia’s gravitational pull is
strong—and overcoming it is critical to creating an effective corporate
strategy. As author and Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers partner Randy
Komisar told us, “If corporations don’t approach rebalancing as fiduciaries for
long-term corporate value, their life span will decline as creative destruction
gets the better of them.”
Cognitive biases
Biases such as
anchoring and loss aversion, which are deeply rooted in the workings of the
human brain and have been much studied by behavioral economists, are major
contributors to the inertia that prevents more active reallocation. Anchoring
refers to the tendency to use any number, even an irrelevant one, as an anchor
for future choices. Judges asked to roll a pair of dice before making a
simulated sentencing decision, for example, are influenced by the result of
that roll, even though they deny they are.
Within a company, last
year’s budget allocation often serves as a ready, salient, and justifiable
anchor during the planning process. We know this to be true in practice, and
it’s been reinforced for us recently as we’ve played a business game with
several groups of senior executives. The game asked participants to allocate a
capital budget across a fictitious company’s businesses and provided players
with identical growth and return projections for the relevant markets. Half of
the group also received details of the previous year’s capital allocation.
Those without last year’s capital budget all allocated
resources in a range that optimized for the expected outlook in market growth
and returns. The other half aligned capital far more closely with last year’s
pattern, which had little to do with the potential for future returns. And this
was a game where the company was fictitious and no one’s career was at risk!
In reality, anchoring
is reinforced by loss aversion: losses typically hurt us at least twice as much
as equivalent gains give us pleasure. That reduces the appetite for taking
risks and makes it painful for managers to give up resources.
Corporate politics
A second major source
of inertia is political. There’s often a tight alignment between the interests
of senior executives and those of their divisions or business units, whose
ability to attract capital can significantly influence the personal credibility
of a leader. Indeed, because executives are competing for resources, anyone who
wins less than he or she did last year is invariably seen as weak. At the
extreme, leaders of business units and divisions see themselves as playing for
their own “teams” rather than for the corporation as a whole, making it
challenging to reallocate resources significantly. Even if a reduction in
resources to their division benefits the company as a whole, ambitious leaders
are unlikely to agree without a fight. As one CEO told us: “If you’re asking me
to play Robin Hood, that’s not going to work.”
Overcoming inertia
Tempting as it is to
believe that one’s own company avoids these traps, our research suggests that’s
unlikely. Our experience also suggests, though, that taking steps such as those
described below can materially improve a company’s resource allocation and its
connection to strategic priorities. These imperatives apply not just to capital
but also to other scarce resources, such as talent, R&D dollars, and
marketing expenditures . All of these also are subject to the forces of
inertia, which can undermine an organization’s ability to achieve its strategic
goals. Consider one company we know that prioritized expanding in China. It set
an ambitious sales growth target for the country and planned to meet it by
supplementing organic growth with a series of acquisitions. Yet it identified
just three people to spearhead this strategic imperative—a small fraction of
the number required, which is typical of the problems that arise when the link
between corporate strategy and resource allocation is weak. Here are four ideas
for doing better.
Inertia may affect the distribution of other
scarce resources, such as advertising spending.
CONTINUES IN PART II
No comments:
Post a Comment