The Best Science Books of 2016
3.
FELT TIME
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A very different take on time, not as
cultural phenomenon but as individual psychological interiority, comes from
German psychologist Marc Wittmannin Felt
Time: The Psychology of How We Perceive Time ) — a fascinating inquiry into how our subjective
experience of time’s passage shapes everything from our emotional memory to our
sense of self. Bridging disciplines as wide-ranging as neuroscience and
philosophy, Wittmann examines questions of consciousness, identity, happiness,
boredom, money, and aging, exposing the centrality of time in each of them.
What emerges is the disorienting sense that time isn’t something which happens
to us — rather, we aretime.
One of Wittmann’s most pause-giving points
has to do with how temporality mediates the mind-body problem. He writes:
Presence means becoming aware of a
physical and psychic self that is temporally extended. To be self-conscious is
to recognize oneself as something that persists through time and is embodied.
In a sense, time is a construction of our
consciousness. Two generations after Hannah Arendt observed in her brilliant
meditation on time that “it is the insertion of man with
his limited life span that transforms the continuously flowing stream of sheer
change … into time as we know it,” Wittmann writes:
Self-consciousness — achieving
awareness of one’s own self — emerges on the basis of temporally enduring
perception of bodily states that are tied to neural activity in the brain’s
insular lobe. The self and time prove to be especially present in boredom. They
go missing in the hustle and bustle of everyday life, which results from the
acceleration of social processes. Through mindfulness and emotional control,
the tempo of life that we experience can be reduced, and we can regain time for
ourselves and others.
Perception
necessarily encompasses the individual who is doing the perceiving. It is I who
perceives. This might seem self-evident. Perception of myself, my ego, occurs
naturally when I consider myself. I “feel” and think about myself. But who is
the subject if I am the object of my own attention? When I observe myself,
after all, I become the object of observation. Clearly, this intangibility of
the subject as a subject — and not an object — poses a philosophical problem:
as soon as I observe myself, I have already become the object of my
observation.
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