Does Business Get Done the Same Way in Emerging and Developed
Countries?
Leaders of
two prominent business enterprises in Turkey, Rahim M. Koç and Hamdi Akin,
discuss the advantages and challenges of being entrepreneurs in an emerging
economy with Professor Felix
Oberholzer-Gee.
On September 12, 1980, the
military launched a coup on the government in Turkey. For many executives, such
instability is the worst nightmare of doing business in a developing country.
But for Turkish entrepreneur Hamdi Akin, usually on the outside looking in,
suddenly the business playing field was level, and he took advantage.
Eventually he would build Akfen Holding, today one of the biggest
infrastructure construction and operations companies.
“As an
outsider in the previous era, this was a fantastic opportunity,” says Felix
Oberholzer-Gee, the Andreas Andresen Professor of Business
Administration in the Strategy unit at Harvard Business School. “No one had
relationships with the parliamentarians—he built his business in part around
this opportunity.”
This idea
that political or economic turmoil creates both business destruction and
opportunity is one of a series of insights emerging for readers of recent HBS
interviews with two prominent Turkish business leaders: Hamdi Akın, chairman of Akfen Holding and Rahim M. Koç, honorary chairman, Koç
Holding.
The companies these men led
during terrific growth phases are similar in some ways, but very different in
others.
With $30 billion in revenue,
The Koç Group is the largest conglomerate in Turkey, with more than 100
companies and 73,000 employees operating in the consumer products, financial
services, and energy industries. It was started in Istanbul by Rahmi’s father,
Vehbi Koç, in 1926, and expanded while Turkey was largely a closed economy.
Although it employs professional managers, members of the family remain very
influential. In fact, as Koç explains in his interview, the business believes
in becoming involved in the family affairs of its most senior executives,
family or not.
Akfen Holding, founded 50 years
after Koç in Ankara, holds a variety of construction, engineering and other
firms related to infrastructure development. It has about 36,000 employees. The
company is publicly traded, but controlling shares are held by the family.
While Akın is the founder and chairman, the family is not involved in the
day-to-day operations of the business.
The
interviews are part of a growing collection with business leaders in developing
countries. The Creating
Emerging Markets project is
sponsored by Harvard Business School’s Business History
Initiative.
We spoke with Oberholzer-Gee, who
conducted both interviews in early 2015, to discuss the differences and
similarities of starting, managing, and leading businesses in emerging markets.
Sean
Silverthorne: When we
think of developing economies or countries, instability is often seen as a
negative. Should you build a business in a place where the rule of law is
suspect? But Hamdi Akın seemed to have thrived in the political turmoil in
Turkey.
Felix
Oberholzer Gee: Creative
destruction is an old idea, going back at least to Schumpeter. We typically
associate it with entrepreneurship. Someone has a brilliant new idea, everyone
is excited and the entrepreneur and his customers are much better off. But, in
the meantime, someone else’s capital probably gets undermined. Creative
destruction of a different kind occurred during the political transition in
Turkey in 1980, after the military coup. Previous political and social
connections lost their value over night. 450 new people sat in parliament, and
none of them had a long history as a politician.
You might see this as a huge
loss of capital. And, in fact, a lot of knowledge was lost in that transition.
Many people had to figure out new things, had to learn how to operate under
difficult circumstances. But for Akın, who was as an outsider in the previous
era, this was a fantastic opportunity. No one had relationships with the
parliamentarians--he built his business in part around this opportunity.
Many academics emphasize the
benefits of stability. When we see wobbly political regimes or uncertainty in
the law, we assume it is detrimental to business. We favor stable situations
and long time horizons that allow executives to make investments. Turkey’s
example provides a richer view: Yes, the change to a military regime undermines
social capital and the rule of law. But, at the same time, the disruption is an
opportunity for outsiders who found it more difficult to build businesses under
the old regime.
Q: So
how does the relationship between business and government differ in developing
nations versus developed nations?
A: I don’t how different it is. We like black
and white, so we like to think of the US economy as market driven, and think of
these emerging markets as the government being everywhere, as having an
outsized influence. Frankly, I think there is more gray than black and white.
For a very large group like
Koç, government relations are critical because many of the big business
opportunities touch politics. Can you become involved in energy without having
a really tight relationship with the government? Probably not. We recently
wrote a case on Turkcell, the leading telecom operator. For this type of
business, it is not surprising that the executive in charge of government
relations is part of the inner circle.
You can look at Turkcell and see
it as a typical emerging-market story. Government intervention is everywhere.
Regulators even set prices, service by service. The competition is tightly
managed. But how different is this from mature markets. Who decides whether you
can buy T Mobile? The U.S. Department of Justice. Who decided it was a good
idea to send consumers a text message before they exceeded data limits on their
cell phones? The Federal Communications Commission.
But there are differences, of
course. Emerging market governments have little hesitation to treat companies
in an unequal fashion. In the cell phone market, the Turkish government sets
both minimum and maximum prices. And the prices set for Turkcell are different
than those for Turkcell’s competitors. That’s the kind of regulation you are
less likely to see in mature markets because the legal system and independent
courts pressure government to be even handed.
Q: Are
there common traits among successful leaders in emerging markets? Are the
executive skillsets they need to succeed fundamentally different than what we
see in more mature economies?
A: In many emerging markets, superior
execution can be the source of astonishing success. The Koç group has a very
successful white goods business. You look at it and ask, what is the source of
the success? Are they doing something completely unheard of? The answer, I
think, is incremental improvement and stellar execution.
People who know how to build
and run a really solid business can be super successful even without a truly
novel idea. What gets the business started is not the novelty of the products.
It’s understanding how you build local distribution, how you go from building
washing machines that have relatively low quality to washing machines that have
decent quality. It is not rocket science. Many people had the necessary
capability, but only a few saw the opportunities and said, OK, I’m going to do
it.
While this pattern of success
is common, it would be a mistake to think that emerging markets are simply
versions of earlier markets that are now mature. I think what is almost always
true of emerging markets is that there are islands of modernity where emerging
markets are way ahead, and then there are islands where they are clearly
backward.
Q: Both
companies have had success globalizing their businesses, but Koç also describes
the uphill battle companies in emerging countries face in trading with
developed nations, which tend to do business with each other. In his interview
with you he says, “It is not easy in this global world. Competition is very,
very tough, even merciless. The mother companies in other markets are very
strong. They can afford to lose ten years in order to get control of one
market.”
A: The Koç Group has had some remarkable
successes in globalizing the group. At the same time it has remained a more
Turkish group than one might have expected. Rahmi Koç makes a good point when
he explains how hard it is to break into mature markets, particularly if you
don’t have a well-known brand or reputation. Some Turkish companies bought old
brands to overcome this barrier.
For example, Koç bought the
Grundig brand in Germany. Grundig was famous for its radios and televisions.
But Koç expanded the scope of the brand to include white goods also. That’s an
attempt to break into markets that are firmly dominated by companies that have
good reputations. Why would a Turkish business (Yildiz Holding) buy Godiva?
It’s not so much that Godiva makes chocolate like no one else can. It’s that
people trust the name.
In markets with significant
scope for differentiation, it’s easier to join the leading companies that
dominate world trade. But if you are in white goods, it is all incremental
improvement and operational effectiveness. And brands loom large. The
importance of operational effectiveness makes it easier to build domestic
capacity, but then makes it really hard to break into Western European or North
American markets. Not impossible—think LG, think Samsung—but expensive and
challenging.
Q:
Especially in your interview with Koç, it was clear he considered his firm’s
reputation to be of extreme importance. I’m not sure you would hear western
executives put as much emphasis on reputation for their success as other
qualities. Or am I over-stating that?
A: Possibly. It is not hard to think of
businesses in mature markets whose main asset is reputation. And the loss of
reputation can be devastating, think of Volkswagen’s current crisis, for
example. But you are right in the sense that the value of reputation increases
in business environments with greater uncertainty. Looking at the large
business groups in Turkey, you might wonder why all these businesses are under
one roof. What’s common across energy, washing machines, and cars? One answer
might be that the resource you have is the reputation of the group. If you
enter a new business, say financial services, why should someone trust you? In
part, your advantage might come from tangible assets such as capital or access
to talent inside the group. Equally important, I believe, is reputation,
knowing that it is Koç or Akfen.
Q: Koç
and Akfen are both family owned. Is this an advantage?
A: One idea is that family firms have longer
time horizons, that they are less susceptible to short-term pressures. There is
some empirical evidence that family firms can make decisions that are
longer-term oriented, but the evidence is not clear cut. And there can be
significant drawbacks to having families manage a business. My colleague Raffaella Sadun has
done fascinating research in which she documents that family-run firms often
fail to introduce management techniques that are closely linked to better
financial performance. So it’s at least an open question whether being a family
firm is an advantage.
The Koç solution, which I find
quite fascinating, is to say that day-to-day operations are firmly in the hands
of professional managers who are brought in from the outside. As Rahmi Koç
explains in the interview, it takes the managers a long time to earn their
stripes. Patience avoids some of the tensions of the (pure) family-run
business. On the one hand you have a larger pool to pick talent from, but by
the time you get to positions of real responsibility, the fact is you are
almost joined at the hip with the family.
Q: Koç
makes a point that the company has no hesitation about becoming involved in the
personal lives of senior executives, even the non-family employees.
A: Yes, you are the professional coming in but
we are extending the relationship—we are hanging out with your family, we’re
all going to picnics, and so on. It feels a little like you are a cousin or
nephew. There are parallels in publicly traded US companies. Sam Walton was
famous for having early Saturday morning meetings. Business was first, but the
families were all there as well. Saturdays were business and family affairs.
Q: Why
has governance evolved that way among some of these firms?
A: It is smart management in good part. They
see the trade-offs and know they can’t be an old-fashioned classic family firm
in an environment that is increasingly competitive and requires them to be
efficient.
Organizational structure was
less important when Turkey was cut off from the rest of the world. All you
needed was an attractive import license, and you were (almost) set for life.
Now it’s a competitive game, now you have global opportunities. Being a family
firm has mixed consequences for performance. Many of the practices in large
Turkish business groups—the way they promote, the way they get engaged with
personal matters and family life—balance these two forces.
Q: What
can readers of these interviews learn about running or improving themselves or
their organizations?
A: The first thing that struck me is the very
many respects that business in emerging markets is just business. In a way,
that is the essence of global management. A thousand things change completely
as you go from one market to another, and a thousand things stay exactly the
same. The difficulty is in knowing which is which—what needs to change, what
can stay the same.
Some executives with little
experience in emerging markets expect them to be radically different. This is
the wrong impression.
Conducting the interviews, I
walked away deeply impressed by the managerial capacity in emerging markets.
The domestic firms are very, very capable. Yes, they operate under particular
constraints—we do not see the many middle managers typical for more mature
markets; there aren’t the sophisticated capital markets that we are used to—but
in many other dimensions, as you hear the executives talk about their
businesses and how they think about their sources of competitive advantage,
it’s not so different from what you would hear in European and North American
boardrooms.
. by Sean Silverthorne
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/is-doing-business-in-emerging-economies-different-than-in-developed-nations
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