Leading with Intellectual Integrity by
LAFLEY OF P&G
One
skill distinguishes the effective CEO: the ability to make disciplined and
integrated choices.
By the time people reach the most
senior levels of a company, they are expected to have a degree of personal
competence and a strong gut feel for making good executive decisions.
Otherwise, they wouldn’t be considered for a top job. But how do they attain
this acumen? At Procter & Gamble (P&G)—where we (A.G. Lafley and Roger
Martin) served as chief executive and one of the senior advisors to the
company, respectively—we developed a systematic approach to cultivating that
skill among emerging and senior executives. We found that business literature
contains a great deal of advice for chief executives about strategy and
execution, but much less is written about how to become the kind of person who
can bring the right judgment to bear on business decisions, especially when
facing a disruptive environment. Thus, many CEOs develop their own form of on-the-job
training, quietly honing their own heuristics for strategic thinking. That
makes it difficult to tease out and develop the personal attributes that
separate successful leaders from less-successful ones.
In our view, leaders would do well
to take a more systematic approach to developing their decision-making
capabilities. The place to start is where we started at P&G: with
intellectual integrity. In common usage, the word integrity means
honorable or virtuous behavior. For our purposes, though, we draw a distinction
between exhibiting honorable behavior (moral integrity) and exhibiting
discipline, clarity, and consistency so that all of one’s decisions fit
together and reinforce one another (intellectual integrity).
In our work with companies, boards,
and government agencies, we see people wrestle with the need to make tough
choices—those critical decisions made in service of a relevant strategic goal
for which there is no fully satisfactory option and every path seems to demand
a trade-off. These are the kinds of decisions for which intellectual integrity
is particularly vital.
Most people, including experienced
executives, don’t like to make choices because it means giving up options.
There is a clear temptation to hedge bets, to try to do everything, to attempt
to keep all doors open at once by refusing to pick from among existing options
or to work to create a better answer. Procter & Gamble was certainly not
immune to this phenomenon. At certain times in the 1990s and 2000s, for
instance, it was tempting to compete in as many markets as possible, as quickly
as possible. Internally, there was a good deal of concern that competitors
would make inroads into important emerging economies that P&G had not yet
entered. But P&G couldn’t be everywhere at once and succeed. Judgments had
to be made about which markets to enter, and in which ways. We explicitly chose
to enter first those promising but underdeveloped markets where none of our
global competitors had a preexisting advantage (for instance, China as it
created special economic zones, Russia and eastern Europe after the fall of the
Iron Curtain) and then to expand thoughtfully in other developing markets. For
example, we entered many Asian countries with our baby-care products first,
conscious that demographics suggested most of the world’s babies would be born
in Asia for the foreseeable future. To fully engage in these countries, we had
to defer or delay pursuit of other markets, in some cases indefinitely.
Intellectual integrity is the
quality that enables a CEO (or any other organizational leader) to set these
kinds of priorities, to articulate the rationale behind them, to stand behind
them even when the outcomes are uncertain, and to provide the support that
others need to stand behind those choices as well. Only a CEO with integrity
can respond to the avoiding-choice temptation appropriately: “No, we can’t do
everything. We must choose to do some things and not others. We just have to
think harder and create the choice that is right for us.”
We’ve seen a lack of intellectual
integrity, and its consequences, in many settings: in large and small
businesses, startups, nonprofits, private equity turnarounds, and government
agencies. Conversely, we’ve seen integrity—on the part of a CEO or other executive
leader—ripple out and deeply affect the culture of an organization. When a
leader has intellectual integrity, the people of the enterprise are less
likely to be distracted by irrelevant considerations, and more likely to
keep focused on the indicators that matter most: those related to customers and
competitors. They are more likely to maintain a long-term view when making
their decisions, and are less susceptible to the dangers of short-term
decisions driven by quarterly financial reporting.
Integrity of this sort is like a
muscle. In a healthy organization, it is exercised often. But if it is ignored
by an organization, the muscle can atrophy, and the organization becomes more
scattered and vulnerable. Such an organization moves in different directions at
the same time, subject to the parochial ideas and priorities of individual
business units and functions. That is why by the time a CEO is appointed, he or
she should have developed his or her intellectual integrity, and should be
prepared to help develop it in others.
Coming
to Grips with Reality
Many company leaders think their
situation is significantly better than it actually is, because they look only
for data that confirms their existing view of the world and listen only to
those voices that agree with them. By contrast, intellectual integrity requires
that one hold oneself and one’s company up to rigorous, challenging
examination. That is the only way to learn to anticipate when reality is likely
to fall short of expectations.
Failure to come to grips with the
reality of the situation led directly to several major competitive losses at
Procter & Gamble in the 1990s. For our oral-care products (including Crest
toothpaste), we invested heavily in overseas distribution in emerging countries
such as Brazil. We thought it would be easy for us to build a business there,
on the basis of our strength in innovation and the brand equity we had
developed in other markets. We didn’t fully recognize that our largest
competitor (Colgate) had far more extensive global distribution, spent twice as
much on oral-care R&D as we did, and had already built up great brand
loyalty in Brazil and other emerging markets.
Because we were distracted by our
expectations, we lost millions of dollars on these investments before we realized
that we needed to change our expansion strategy. We decided to retreat from
Brazil and get our house in order before returning there. We also saw we needed
a broad P&G strategy for scaling up in new markets, building a sustainable
business one core brand at a time. In Brazil, this led us to focus on our
strengths in laundry products and baby care. For oral care, we explicitly
concentrated on winning in North America and China before turning our attention
back to Brazil. When we demonstrated that integrity in our strategic decision
making, things worked much better for us in Brazil and elsewhere.
Similarly, in our Pampers disposable
diaper business, we held a strong belief that the best way to leverage our
global scale was to install a single, sophisticated manufacturing system, using
state-of-the-art “converters” that could produce all our diapers across all our
different markets. To compete with lower-priced rivals in developing markets,
we assumed, we needed only to switch to less-expensive materials and remove
some of the features. Because, in effect, we let the machines dictate our
strategy, we didn’t see that our technology solution failed to address the real
needs of emerging market consumers. When this became clear, we began to design
new kinds of products, specifically engineered for emerging market
consumers—with consumers, and not the machines, in mind. This meant we had to
reverse course on some very expensive manufacturing systems, and switch to
different machines for different markets.
The
Strategic Choice Cascade
To instill intellectual integrity
throughout a company—as opposed to leaving its development to chance—some kind
of explicit, ongoing decision-making process is needed. At Procter &
Gamble, the method we used was known as the strategic choice cascade. Each
year, we asked hundreds of company leaders, at all levels, to develop choices
explicitly using this framework. The cascade consisted of five interdependent
choices . We said explicitly that none of these choices should be treated as
“silver bullets” to solve short-range problems. Nor could they be made in
isolation from each other.
The first choice is that of a
winning aspiration. Winning matters. Without a competitive goal, it is easy to
become complacent and settle for being “good enough.” Settling for good enough
means failing to make the tough choices and do the hard work of building
outstanding capabilities. At P&G, we chose, at the company-wide level, to
meaningfully improve the lives of the world’s consumers and, by doing so, drive
consistent double-digit profit growth. Articulating a winning aspiration was
not a major stretch for most P&G leaders, given the company’s long history
of attempting to achieve decisive product leadership across its many
categories. Nonetheless, it was a message that warranted reinforcement.
Next come the choices of “Where will
we play?” and “How will we win in our chosen markets?” These are the core
choices, the heart of any strategy. Choosing where to play means choosing in
which markets, for which customers, in which product lines, in which
geographies you will compete. Choosing how to win means figuring out how to
create a sustainable competitive advantage on a specific playing field. These
choices can have integrity only when they fit together consistently; that is,
when the how-to-win choice is made in the context of the where-to-play choice.
At P&G, our where-to-play choices focused on a core group of brands,
customers, and geographic markets. We would start with market leadership in the
home, beauty, health, and personal-care sectors, and position for long-term
growth in emerging economies. Our how-to-win choice was to build powerful
consumer-focused brands that took advantage of ubiquitous distribution and
global scale.
We rethought brand and product
positioning in terms of where to play and how to win as well. For example, for
the skin-care brand Olay, we shifted our where-to-play from women over 50 who
were targeting wrinkles, to women age 35 to 50 who were fighting the first
signs of aging, which we successfully characterized as “the seven signs of
aging.” How would we compete to win with this new segment? By upgrading the
active ingredient, transforming the packaging, and partnering with our mass
retailers to create a “masstige” (mass-prestige) in-store experience that
rivaled the prestige brands in department stores. The result was a
fast-growing, high-profit brand that revitalized the category.
For household cleaning, we thought
entirely differently about cleaning hard surfaces. We determined that there
might be new cleaning jobs around the home not served by existing products.
Rather than continue to focus on well-served areas like countertops and
sinks, we turned to floor cleaning. There, we pioneered an entirely new
category, a new way to win in household cleaning, with the Swiffer
electrostatic mop. Subsequently, with our Mr. Clean brand, the key
where-to-play area became stains on household surfaces. To win, we launched the
“Magic Eraser,” an innovative line of products that remove scuffs and stains
easily, taking some of the hard work out of cleaning. In short, with both Mr.
Clean and Swiffer, we saw a need for quick-cleaning solutions, and rather than
attempt to force-fit existing products to consumers’ needs, we pursued a path
with more intellectual integrity. We devised entirely new-to-the-world
products, designed specifically with a consumer need in mind.
In our fine fragrances business,
intellectual integrity meant taking the long view. Fine fragrances can be an
intensely competitive field, so we made an important where-to-play choice to
focus first on the male fragrances segment, which was considerably less
competitive than the women’s market. To win in fragrances over the long term,
we built on our existing expertise. P&G has long been the world’s largest
purchaser of fragrances, which go into laundry detergents, soaps, shampoos,
conditioners, deodorants, dish soaps, fabric softeners, and other products. We
put our deep experience in combining scents and formulating appealing fragrances
to work on licensed fragrance brands like Hugo Boss and Lacoste. As we expanded
our fragrance lines, eventually turning to women’s brands as well, our scale
enabled us to both purchase our ingredients and manufacture our products very
cost-effectively. Over time, we grew more sophisticated in understanding
consumer reactions to fragrances. This further enhanced our formulation
expertise. It enabled us to build a strong business in beauty care.
Cohesion
and Cascades
These first three choices—our
winning aspiration, where to play, and how to win—are closely tied to the final
two choices on the cascade: “What capabilities must be in place for us to win?”
and “What management systems are required?”
Capabilities are those things you
must do exceedingly well in order to deliver on your aspiration, where-to-play,
and how-to-win choices. In thinking about our capabilities in light of our
other choices, we came to see our core capabilities as deep consumer
understanding, innovation, brand building, going to market with customers and
suppliers, and global scale. In each of these areas, we had room to deepen and
grow our expertise.
In terms of scale, we had tended to
focus on scale within a brand or category, such as laundry detergent or beauty
care. We had to work hard to expand our thinking about scale to encompass the
whole company—for example, by bringing our global business services (IT, HR,
and other internal functions) together into one department. This encouraged the
leaders of our global business services to ask how they could better serve
their internal customers globally, and how they could smartly outsource their
lower-value-added activities. Now, the real scale advantages began to accrue.
We reduced costs across the company, worked more closely with customers in ways
that increased our importance to them, and managed our supplier relationships
in new ways that made all of us better. These changes were possible only
because of our growing intellectual integrity.
Finally, one must ask, “What
internal management systems are required?” Select the ones that can best ensure
that your required capabilities add up to a platform for advantage. Systems and
measures are essential to building capabilities and supporting the other
strategic choices. But to have intellectual integrity, a leader must make an
explicit choice to develop these systems.
At P&G, for instance, when it
came to our branding capability, we had traditionally done a poor job of
systematically learning from our marketing successes and failures. Most institutional
knowledge on brand building and marketing was captured in pithy one-page memos
or passed down in anecdotal storytelling by managers who had lived through the
experience. The implicit message was that if young brand managers and assistant
brand managers hung around seasoned brand builders long enough, they would
master all they had to learn about marketing in due course.
In 2000, for the first time in the
company’s history, we launched a project to codify P&G’s approach to brand
building. The resulting “Brand-Building Framework” (BBF) laid out the company’s
approach in one coherent document, which is still regularly updated. With the
BBF frameworks in place, new P&G marketers can learn the trade more
quickly, and senior managers have an organized and written resource to guide
their efforts. The BBF serves as a management system that nurtures and enhances
the critical brand-building capacity of P&G. Organizational infrastructure
like this was central to everything we did, and it enabled us to improve the
overall integrity of decisions made throughout P&G.
It is important to emphasize that
for every brand, these five choices must clearly fit together. As a strategist,
you can start anywhere in the choice cascade, but you must make all five
choices and they must all be coordinated. This is the truly challenging part of
strategy. The choices themselves are not terribly complex or difficult. But
integrating them, and refusing to stop thinking until they genuinely reinforce
one another, takes true intellectual integrity.
Moreover, in a large company, the
choices made at the category, function, and company-wide level must also fit
together and reinforce one another. The choices made by the Bounty paper towel
team, for instance, must have integrity with the overall P&G choices made
by the CEO and senior team.
Sometimes, when the cohesion between
choices isn’t strong enough, divestiture is the best answer. This was the case
for P&G’s pharmaceuticals business. It was a strong and growing business,
with important brands and products. But over time, it became clear that the
kinds of choices, capabilities, and systems required to win in this business
did not mesh well enough with the company’s core businesses. P&G is at its
best when it can develop branded products through a standardized innovation
process, sell through its best customers (such as Walmart and Walgreen
Company), and develop a long-term relationship with its end consumers. In
pharmaceuticals, there is a highly specialized and complex development process
with many steps not in common with our standard approach—including blind trials
and FDA approvals. The industry also has a different marketing model from that
of consumer products. It sells directly to doctors and pharmacies; consumers
don’t make the purchase decisions and may never know the brand name of the
drug, or who makes it. In the end, we divested a profitable pharmaceutical
business, believing it could be more successful elsewhere.
In divesting this business, P&G
walked away from billions of dollars of sales and profits, but it was the right
decision. Walking away allowed the company to reinvest cash, human resources,
and other assets in businesses that did have integrity with its overall set of
strategy choices: beauty, home, and personal care. When P&G acquired
Gillette in 2002, it was as much for the sake of integrity—for its fit with the
firm’s choices and competencies—as it was for the strength of its male
grooming, personal-care, and oral-care brands.
Building
Integrity at P&G
The five cascading choices provide a
structure within which to practice intellectual integrity. Participants are
continually drawn back to the same crucial decisions: what to aspire to, where
to play, how to win there, which capabilities to build, and which management
systems to set up. This framework removes a great deal of fear and anxiety,
especially among lower-level managers and those far from headquarters, about
doing the right thing.
But, like any other system involving
behavior change, the cascade process takes some time to learn and requires
concerted attention. At P&G, once we recognized the importance of
consistent, integrated decision making, we looked for other ways to foster it.
We knew that integrity is not a fixed quality that people inherit at birth; it
can be cultivated and developed, in part through training but mostly through
better business practice and by encouraging the right types of conversations.
We thus began to explicitly identify
up-and-coming high-potential executives and coach them in strategy, inquiry,
and the process of making integrated choices. We redesigned the strategic
review process, turning it into a vehicle for building the strategic integrity
muscles of our entire leadership cadre. Previously, annual strategy reviews
were like corporate theater—a setting that did not encourage integrity. The
presidents of P&G’s businesses and their teams trooped in before the
company’s most senior executives with bulletproof PowerPoint presentations. The
presenters naturally wanted to show their results, defend their decisions, and
get out of the room as rapidly as possible. They didn’t welcome critical
probing of the logic of their choices. When senior leadership felt that
resistance, they either kept their reservations private or piled on with attacks—in
which case the presenting team had no choice but to take the criticism and then
slink out, proverbial tails between their legs.
The old strategic review process had
also been an impediment to collaboration among P&G’s businesses and
functions. If the hair-care category president came into the review seeking
only to defend his strategy and avoid any criticism, he would be less likely to
talk openly about how the hair-care choice cascade fit with the choice cascade
for skin care or home care. Nor would senior leadership be inclined to force
the issue. Yet such discussions are vital. Without firsthand experience with
just that type of dialogue—knitting together various choice cascades across a
corporation—emerging leaders can’t develop their strategic integrity muscle,
and senior leaders get less practice doing so as well.
To address these roadblocks, we
fundamentally transformed the process and tone of our annual strategy reviews.
We shifted the paradigm to one of candid conversation and exploration. Teams
still prepared a strategy presentation in advance of the meeting, but rather
than take time in the meeting to review it, they provided the work to the
senior team several weeks in advance. The senior team then issued to the
category team a set of discussion topics for the meeting.
This enabled us to focus the meeting
on constructive dialogue involving those specific strategic issues, and it
helped shift the tone from defensiveness to a joint exploration of
possibilities. We also initiated a continuous series of conversations on
strategic matters, conducted at all levels: brand, category, sector, customer,
channel, region, country. A common theme of these discussions was how the
choices knitted together, how they fit with the broader corporate strategy, and
how the team planned to measure results moving ahead. These discussions were
driven by a commitment to asking tough questions, which brought issues to the
surface that everyone was thinking privately but nobody felt ready to say out
loud. Articulating these kinds of thoughts can create helpful tension and can
lead to a true shared purpose.
Toward
a World of Integrity
Throughout all the strategy
discussions at P&G, the objective was to get leaders comfortable with
collaborating on strategy, playing with ideas, and challenging their own
thinking—and thus to build the integrity of the leadership of the company. By
framing strategy as the answer to five integrated questions, we avoided
fragmentation. Fragmentation is a trap that all organizations, whether in the
for-profit, nonprofit, or government sectors, can fall into—to their own
detriment.
In the U.S. government, for
instance, right now, many groups are working in one way or another on energy
policies. But there is no comprehensive strategy, no single set of aspirations
that guide an integrated set of cascading choices for the country’s energy
future. Instead of having an integrated aspiration, a sense of where to play, a
sense of how to win there, and the right capabilities, the United States is
lurching from the Canadian pipeline to alternative energy investments to
shale-based oil and gas. Companies fall into the same trap, attempting to do
everything at once without a guiding principle to direct resources and drive
action. The result is wasted resources, inaction, and disillusionment. It
doesn’t have to be that way.
At P&G, every strategy document
at every level of the organization had to specify clear where-to-play and
how-to-win choices. Not every CEO will define the company’s choices in that
explicit way, but every CEO should internalize the need to make every
choice—from aspiration through management systems—part of an overarching,
integrated strategy.
This will pay off, but it won’t be
easy. None of these choices can be exercised through a rulebook or through
top-down fiat. They can’t be made once, and then left for all time. Strategy
choices have to be made thoughtfully and organically with a good deal of
organizational give and take. They must be revisited and reexamined regularly.
Norms and assumptions must be challenged, and every attempt must be made to see
the world as it is, not as it was or as you would wish it to be. It’s far, far
easier to refuse to make these choices, to make them in isolation from each
other, or to make them for only one part of the business without considering
the implications for the whole.
It takes intellectual integrity to
insist upon the continued practice of choice cascades throughout the
organization. It’s tough to answer the questions posed in this exercise, and tougher
still to follow through with action. But the alternative—attempting to win in
the marketplace with no consistent company-wide strategy—is ultimately far more
difficult.
by
A.G. Lafley and Roger Martin, with Jennifer Rielhttp://www.strategy-business.com/article/00186?pg=all
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