Entrepreneurship and Multinationals Drive Globalization
Why
is the firm overlooked as a contributor when we identify the drivers of
globalization? Geoffrey Jones discusses his new book, Entrepreneurship and
Multinationals: Global Business and the Making of the Modern World.
In
a new book on the origins and impacts of globalization, Harvard Business
School's Geoffrey Jones focuses on the role played by a vital but
often ignored actor in this conversation: business entrepreneurs and the
multinational enterprises they create.
"There
has been remarkably little concern with the role of firms in creating markets,
shaping policies, and diffusing globalization," says Jones, the Isidor
Straus Professor of Business History, and Faculty Chair of the School's
Business History Initiative.
In
this interview conducted over e-mail, Jones discusses the book, Entrepreneurship and Multinationals: Global Business and
the Making of the Modern World, and his views on subjects ranging from
whether globalism has been a force for good to what Nazi Germany tells us about
the difficulty in planning for political risk.
Sean
Silverthorne:
Why did you write this book and what are its major themes?
Geoffrey
Jones: I
have long been interested in the causes of globalization and its impact on
societies. Both questions are best answered by looking at lengthy periods of
time, and this has been my focus. I have often published in the scholarly
journals or academic conference volumes, and in the spirit of the whole being
greater than the sum of the parts, I sought to pull together my research and
conclusions in this book, in the hope of reaching broader audiences.
I
address three key themes. First, I show that entrepreneurs and their firms have
been important actors in the making of the global world over the last two
centuries. Individual entrepreneurs and managers invented new products and
shaped consumer demand. Firms created and diffused technologies and products,
alongside the values in which they were embedded. They lit up the cities of the
world with electricity and turned India into the world's largest tea producer
during the nineteenth century. They built
automobile industries in Latin America after World War II. And so on.
Second, I wanted to demonstrate the
relative importance of business compared to governments and other institutional
actors in building global capitalism. In both the historical and economics
literatures, firms are typically black boxes responding to exogenous factors
such as government policies, institutions, or resource endowments. I show that
firms have agency. When governments attempted to reverse globalization during
the interwar years, firms redesigned their international businesses rather than
abandon them. Multinationals preserved dimensions of globalization even as
governments closed down flows of trade and capital across borders. Yet firms
were rarely able to wholly dictate events. Their ability to transfer technology
was constrained by the institutional, educational, and cultural conditions of
host economies. Certainly after 1914, I show that governments were persistent
constraints on the autonomy of firms. The book has several case studies that
explore this issue. The instances when firms could really dictate to
governments, as when the United Fruit Company orchestrated the CIA overthrow of
the government in Guatemala in 1954, were exceptional.
Third, I explore whether, if
business was a shaper of global capitalism, it was a force for good, or
otherwise. I show that the heterogeneity of business enterprise renders this
question challenging to answer, and perhaps misleading even to ask. In the
broadest sense, the growth of global capitalism has been associated with
enormous increases in wealth, as well as dramatic rises in the longevity, of
humanity. Yet capitalism too has had its dark side. The book contains multiple
examples of the amoral nature of global capitalism, from opium trading in
nineteenth century China to the willingness of large networking firms in the
United States to sell equipment enabling the Chinese government to censor the
Web and identify political opponents. As the economist William Baumol has
argued, entrepreneurship can be productive, unproductive, or destructive, and this
is certainly evident in the history of global capitalism.
Q: You note that as the history of globalization continues to
be written, the importance of the role of businesses enterprises in the process
"has tended to be written out of the script." Why is this so?
A:
This odd situation results from the idiosyncratic nature of academic
disciplines which develop their own norms and conventions about interesting
research questions and how to answer them.
For several decades mainstream
academic historians, especially those based in the United States, have devoted
almost no attention to business as such, as the profession focused on the role
of culture, race, gender, and religion in historical developments. Economic
historians, often in recent decades trained in economics, have done pioneering
work in quantifying historical trends in the integration of world markets.
However these scholars have been far more interested in markets and
institutional structures than firms. Political scientists, although more interested
in firms, have focused primarily on the politics and policy decisions which
impacted and drove globalization. Sociologists, who have approached the subject
of globalization from the perspective of organizations, have primarily focused
on states and intergovernmental organizations.
The upshot has been that there has
been remarkably little concern with the role of firms in creating markets,
shaping policies, and diffusing globalization.
Q: An interesting paradox is that even as the West
successfully created multinational enterprises around the world after the
industrial revolution, an increasing wealth gap or "great divergence"
between the West and the rest of the world, continued to widen. Why weren't
developing countries more able to benefit from trade and to learn
entrepreneurial skills from the West, which could have helped them bridge this
divide?
A:
The drivers of the stickiness of modern economic growth is one of the most
important questions in economic history. The leading explanations focus on so-called
institutional failure, inadequate human capital development, or a lack of value
systems conducive to modern entrepreneurship. The particular focus in this book
is why multinational firms were not better transferors of innovation and
entrepreneurial capabilities from the West to the Rest.
The historical evidence makes clear
that multinationals in general have never been a panacea for growth. During the
nineteenth century, most multinational investment in developing countries went
into natural resources and related services. These were often enclave
investments, like mining towns, with few links to the local economy. Firms
employed expatriates in skilled and managerial positions. Worse still, many
businesses were based on concessions from local dictators. This had the effect
of reinforcing local institutional constraints on domestic entrepreneurship
rather than removing them.
There was the more general issue,
still as relevant today, that the ability of multinationals to transfer
technology was constrained by the institutional, educational, and cultural
conditions of host economies. Multinationals do not do things to countries and
societies; they interact with them. For better or worse, they have not
transformed national institutions or radically shifted societal norms.
Multinationals had their most positive impacts on countries which already had
sufficient educational levels and developed institutional structures to benefit
from them.
The lack of a straightforward
correlation between multinational investment and economic success is
highlighted in the chapter on the impact of multinationals on Asia. This shows
that the economies which developed the most diverse, complex, and
technologically dynamic industrial sectors—Japan, Republic of Korea and Taiwan—were
precisely those with the least reliance on foreign firms, which were excluded
by industrial policy and other measures. Of course this is not necessarily a
policy prescription: other Asian countries with low levels of inward foreign
direct investment, like Pakistan, Myanmar, Cambodia, and North Korea, did not
flourish.
Q: The beauty industry is a terrific vehicle to study the
impact of globalization over the long run. Did globalization homogenize beauty
ideals and practices?
As the world globalized in the
nineteenth century, there was an unmistakable homogenization of beauty ideals
and practices around the world. In the age of imperialism, Western and white
beauty ideals emerged as the global standard. This was historically contingent
on the unique circumstances prevailing at that time, but once the standard was
in place, the marketing and branding strategies of firms helped to make it
reinforcing. The momentum behind this standard was reinforced by the impact of
Hollywood and other drivers of an international consumer culture. Beauty
companies formed an important component of a wider business ecosystem, which
included movie studios, pageant organizers, and fashion magazines.
Yet the process of homogenization,
powerful as it was, was never complete. The local was never entirely subsumed
by the homogenized global. Convergence and homogenization was stronger in
aspirations than in preferences for particular products or scents, which
remained more persistently local, despite the spread of global brand names.
I think the more recent era of
globalization over the last 20 years has coincided with a strong revival in
interest in local traditions and practices, which is particularly noticeable in
some of the fastest-growing emerging markets, such as China. As a result, the
leading firms in the industry now find themselves struggling with the challenge
of how to respond to consumers who require increasingly nuanced mixtures of the
global and the local in the brands they buy. In beauty, as in many other
things, globalization is no longer a one-way street. There is a new pluralism
in beauty markets worldwide. Globalization is enabling alternative visions of
beauty, whether Chinese or Brazilian, to be offered to consumers worldwide,
both by local firms and by Western multinationals anxious to offer their
consumers more choices. Whether Shanghai and Rio de Janeiro become as globally
relevant as beauty capitals as Paris and New York have been in the past remains
to be seen.
Q: After World War I, global firms turned much focus on
protecting themselves from political risk. Given that political risk remains in
many countries as strong today, what have we learned about companies that have
done this successfully?
I argue in the book that after the
outbreak of World War I, the management of political risk became a central
concern for firms operating internationally. These risks were on many levels,
from expropriation to exchange controls and other economic policies. The issue
is explored in multiple chapters, but the chapter on the German health and skin
care company Beiersdorf is the most dramatic. Beiersdorf faced the worst of all
worlds in terms of political risk. It was a determined multinational investor
before World War I, and then lost everything as the United States and other
Allied governments expropriated German property. As a consumer products
manufacturer whose brands and trademarks lay at the heart of its competitive
advantages in international markets, the loss of these intangible assets was
especially damaging. However, worse was to come. During the 1930s as a
so-called Jewish business, the arrival of the Nazi's put the firm in harm's way
in its home market.
Beiersdorf invested heavily in
political risk management. In the wake of World War I, the company developed a
"ring" organizational structure as a way for affiliates to disguise
ownership, circumvent national regulations, or even adopt a different
nationality. It used trust to support this organizational structure. The firm
built a network of trustworthy individuals and business partners that enabled
it, eventually, to separate the German parent company from its international
affiliates. In circumstances when the rule of law was breaking down, the
company switched from relying on formal contracts to relying on reliable local
partners and friends. At home, during the 1930s it was able to circumvent
attacks on its "Jewish" identity from competitors, whilst getting
senior Jewish managers out of the country. The company's brand and marketing
strategy was broadly aligned with the requirements of the Nazi regime.
The outcomes of these strategies
show the strengths and limitations of political risk management. The company
survived the Nazi regime and the destruction of World War II. The situation was
more challenging internationally. A profitable business was maintained during
the 1930s, despite a welter of exchange controls and other restrictions which
handicapped German and other firms. In the longer term, the ring strategy
failed to protect most of the firm's foreign assets from expropriation.
Factories and key trademarks were lost in most markets. As the rule of law was
reestablished in the international economy, deals done on the basis of trust
unraveled. It was a striking testament to the damage caused to German business by
World War II that Beiersdorf, which had so carefully invested in organizational
structures to counter political risk, only recovered ownership of the Nivea
brand in the United States and Britain in 1973 and 1992 respectively. Neither
contracts nor trust could protect German firms from the consequences of the
traumatic political events of these years.
The lesson from this, and other
cases in the book, is that developing appropriate organizational structures and
strategies to manage political risks can bring substantive benefits. However,
in the event of a major military conflict or a revolution, even the most
careful planning is unlikely to save the day. In less extreme situations, the
case of Unilever is instructive. In India, Turkey and other developing countries,
the firm was an early mover in appointing nationals to senior management
positions, and in making broad social investments. It was still almost
regulated out of existence in both countries during the 1970s by governments
which simply disliked private capitalism in general, and foreign firms in
particular, but it was able to survive until better times, in contrast to most
multinationals which fled those countries.
by Sean Silverthorne http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/7386.html
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