In search of a better stretch
target
Aggressive
goals can dramatically improve a company’s performance. But unachievable goals
can do more harm than good. Here’s how to stretch without breaking.
The urge to improve is innate in most
companies, where better service, stronger performance, and faster operations
are inextricably tied to earnings, bonuses, and shareholder returns. The
impetus is so strong, in fact, that the practice of setting stretch targets for
a company’s performance has become emblematic for the grit and aggressiveness
expected of a modern executive. Managers take pride in seeking to achieve the
unthinkable.
Sometimes they succeed,
surprising even themselves with how much stretch targets can improve
performance. But there are limits to how far they can push. The wrong metrics
can sap motivation and undermine performance.1Targets set along one metric
without regard for the effect on performance elsewhere can destroy value. And
broad-based aggregate measures of profit margin, operating profit, and earnings
per share are only loosely linked to valuation. One CFO recently admitted to us
that his multibillion-dollar global company would hit its quarterly goals for
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA), but
only at the cost of reducing its operating cash flow. Signs of unhealthy
stretch targets can be quite clear—and any of them can lead to poor behaviors,
distracting senior managers and having no impact on value.
Healthy stretch targets
start with using the right kinds of metrics: achievable, focused, transparent,
and grounded in objective data tied to value creation. But even the right kinds
of metrics can destroy value when managers neglect best practices. In our
experience, a healthier stretch requires companies to calibrate targets against
cross-functional trade-offs. It demands that executives build trust with
employees, rewarding success rather than always moving the goal up, but also
that they confirm that employees succeed fairly. And it requires that there be
no stigma attached to bringing out bad news, so that employees are encouraged
to be transparent about their progress.
Calibrate cross-functional trade-offs between targets
The larger and more
complex a company is, the more likely one unit or function’s stretch targets
will affect the performance of others. For example, reducing inventory levels
to meet a working-capital target can make it hard to fill orders if a company’s
production system, its demand, and its suppliers are not stable enough—and that
can lead to lost sales. Conversely, if a sales team pushes for 7 percent growth
in a market that is growing at 4 percent, for example, it’s likely to chase as
many deals as possible. Since the team can’t sell what the company doesn’t
have, they’ll have to initiate production even for deals that are more likely
to fall through. That, in turn, affects performance up and down the supply
chain—with negative consequences for the company’s cash-conversion rate,
depending on how much unsold inventory piles up.
CFOs—or other C-suite
managers—can set targets from a cross-functional perspective across the entire
business, but they often lack a functional or business-unit perspective on the
details. The business-unit leaders they rely on for those details often promote
different metrics depending on their own siloed vantage points. In the end,
managers often resort to targets anchored in past
performance, catchy slogans, or just lazy application. We often see them simply adding a flat percentage-point increase to last year’s results, averaging performance levels across an entire group, or setting sales targets based on growth assumptions oblivious to the pace of the market (exhibit). Managers at one Asian company arbitrarily targeted 25 percent growth per year for 25 years—apparently unencumbered by the mathematical implications. And managers at a global manufacturer decided that tripling inventory turns would be an inspirational target, even though the company was already better than most of its peers and the target was physically impossible.
performance, catchy slogans, or just lazy application. We often see them simply adding a flat percentage-point increase to last year’s results, averaging performance levels across an entire group, or setting sales targets based on growth assumptions oblivious to the pace of the market (exhibit). Managers at one Asian company arbitrarily targeted 25 percent growth per year for 25 years—apparently unencumbered by the mathematical implications. And managers at a global manufacturer decided that tripling inventory turns would be an inspirational target, even though the company was already better than most of its peers and the target was physically impossible.
Managers that set the
best stretch targets do so with a clear understanding of the trade-offs between
interconnected objectives—between earnings goals and cash needs, for example,
or between growth objectives and R&D costs. The experience at one
manufacturing company is illustrative. Managers of the various units each
sought to optimize their own particular target. Manufacturing wanted to
maintain a constant level of production to keep utilization up. Sales wanted
shorter lead times and more product variants. Sourcing wanted lower unit costs.
And finance wanted to improve cash performance. This led to uncertainty among
functions and made it difficult for any of them to plan. For example, sourcing
could cut costs if there were more certainty on volumes from sales, and sales
could sell more and hit its target margins if it was clear that sourcing could
lower costs.
To make the various
functions work better together, the company undertook an exercise to align the
key assumptions that they should all use for planning purposes. That way,
everyone would be using consistent assumptions on costs, price, and the
performance baseline. These included, for example, that sales should assume a
certain cost per unit if managers committed to selling a certain number of
units. Through several iterations, the company was able to set a matrix of
targets to which each function could commit, knowing that other functions had
committed to delivering the prerequisites for success. Based on this, each
function was able to create a comprehensive plan to achieve the targets.
Build trust with employees—but verify they succeed fairly
Stretch targets succeed
only when employees believe they can meet their goals if they try hard enough
and that they will be rewarded if they do. There has to be a chance of failure
in order to motivate employees to work harder. But if they expect failure and
see targets as unrealistic, they will conclude that they won’t receive a bonus
anyway and just stop trying. When their good work earns them little more than
endless rounds of ever-harder-to-meet stretch targets, they’re more likely to
hold opportunities in reserve—allowing themselves to fall short for one goal in
order to improve their chances of meeting the next one. That leads to lower
performance, poor morale, and declining trust in management. Expecting this
kind of sandbagging, managers set ever more aggressive targets, and a vicious cycle
of eroding trust develops.
Moreover, when the path
to improvement looks like it will take too long, managers also need to be on
the lookout for shortcuts. Function or unit managers can use a variety of
cheats that improve some metrics in the short term. But such cheats can also
create a kind of expectations treadmill that demands ever greater improvements
over time and ultimately undermines the company’s overall performance. For
instance, when sales repeatedly offers customers big discounts to take delivery
at the end of the quarter—so-called pull-ins—customers learn to time their
purchases in expectation of those benefits. When sourcing pushes out orders to
the day after quarter’s end, plant inventory levels skyrocket immediately after
the end of the quarter. When business managers change inventory-reserve
policies, they may improve earnings temporarily, but not cash flow.
Some companies address
this gaming with a combination of executive jawboning and visible consequences.
The CEO and CFO repeatedly emphasize the importance of doing things the right
way and celebrate successes. But they also deal harshly, even publicly, with
any instances of egregious gaming. Others have employed more structural
guardrails, strengthening their underlying systems to make sure that targets
aren’t gamed. For example, when managers at one company discovered that the
sales staff was systematically creating fake orders in the system to ensure
that supply would be available for last-minute orders, they introduced a more
robust process to scrutinize orders. To prevent last-minute sales pull-ins,
managers set a firm deadline for when orders could be placed and required new
documentation from customers before approving an order and initiating
production. And they reviewed their sales- and operations-planning processes to
identify and remove unlikely commitments.
Setting targets
collaboratively can also help. Executives at one global materials company, for
example, spent six weeks analyzing and benchmarking performance targets that they
could realistically achieve. They then spent another six weeks identifying
specific initiatives and developing detailed implementation plans—including a
weekly dialogue to fine-tune their stretch targets and confirm the targets
worked together. In the end, the full senior-executive team committed to the
plan, and the numbers were memorialized in a progressive series of targets that
were reviewed weekly to prevent backtracking. The outcome exceeded senior
management’s expectations—with the additional benefit of strongly felt
ownership throughout the organization of the actions taken to deliver the
target.
Make it safe to share bad news
It’s human nature to
discount, ignore, or deny bad news. And when everyone is striving for a stretch
target, it’s hard to admit that you’re the one falling behind. As a result, we
often see managers taken by surprise when everyone finally admits where they
are in the last few days of the quarter. Performance forecasts at one company,
for example, were consistent with the expectations of meeting the stretch
targets for many months. So managers were taken aback at the end of the quarter
when actual performance numbers were much worse. In the aftermath, they were
chagrined to learn that business and functional group leaders had known the
stretch targets were unreachable for several months but were reluctant to break
the news.
Such surprises can
leave companies in an unexpectedly bad position. For instance, if manufacturing
waits until a week before deliveries are expected to lower its production
commitments, the sales force would be in an extremely poor position with
customers. Such behavior could lead to lower sales, or it may lead sales
managers to overforecast demand or artificially accelerate delivery deadlines.
We have seen companies
address this in several ways. If managers set interim milestones for major
deliverables and a regular operating mechanism to review them, they can create
an early warning signal that something might be at risk. For instance, one
milestone for commercial deals might be obtaining essential permits and
qualifications by a certain date. If managers learn that the permits are
running behind schedule, they would see that as an early sign that the deals
might not land as expected.
Managers can also reward
people for coming forward with potential issues and working proactively to
solve them—even if this involves reporting bad news. At one global chemical
company, for example, junior-level managers alerted senior executives that
negotiations with customers and suppliers hadn’t led to expected supply-chain
improvements and that some value continued to be lost with regard to service.
Fortunately, they elevated the bad news early enough in the cycle to address
it, even presenting an action plan to fill the gap with the stretch targets,
and were recognized for their resilience. Facing similar shortfalls in meeting
demand-management targets, another unit was ultimately praised for
collaborating across functions to create a solution that was in the interest of
the business overall and not just their own work stream.
Managers can improve a
company’s performance by setting the right stretch targets that motivate
employees. But pushing too hard can have the opposite effect.
By Ryan Davies, Hugues Lavandier, and Ken
Schwartz November 2017
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/in-search-of-a-better-stretch-target?cid=other-eml-alt-mip-mck-oth-1711
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